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Abstract 
A UNIQUE HALLMARK OF CRIMINAL LAW is that it concerns itself with the moral culpability of offenders. 
Penal theory has long purported to align with the prevalent orthodoxies of criminology, which have been 
increasingly informed by cognitive science. Recent advancements in brain imaging and neuroscience 
have revealed a growing ability to target structural and functional impairments that predispose 
psychopathy and violent tendencies. Neurointerventions, Crime, and Punishment delineates the ethical 
objections to the use of brain interventions, or “neurointerventions” (NIs) on offenders within a criminal 
justice framework for the purpose of crime prevention. 
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FIONA SARAZIN2
A UNIQUE HALLMARK OF CRIMINAL LAW is that it concerns itself with the moral 
culpability of offenders.3 Penal theory has long purported to align with the 
prevalent orthodoxies of criminology, which have been increasingly informed by 
cognitive science. Recent advancements in brain imaging and neuroscience have 
revealed a growing ability to target structural and functional impairments that 
predispose psychopathy and violent tendencies.4 Neurointerventions, Crime, and 
Punishment delineates the ethical objections to the use of brain interventions, 
or “neurointerventions” (NIs) on offenders within a criminal justice framework 
for the purpose of crime prevention.5 NIs encompass a variety of methods that 
affect the conative, affective, or cognitive aspects of the mind.6 The author, 
1. Jesper Ryberg, Neurointerventions, Crime, and Punishment (Oxford University Press, 2019).
2. J.D. Candidate (2021), Osgoode Hall Law School; B.Sc. Microbiology & Immunology, 
McGill University.
3. Paul H Robinson, “The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert” (1996) 
76 BUL Rev 201.
4. See e.g. Hannah L Bedard, “The Potential for Bioprediction in Criminal Law” (2017) 
18 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 268; Yaling Yang, Andrea L Glenn & Adrian Raine, “Brain 
abnormalities in antisocial individuals: implications for the law” (2008) 26 Behavioral 
Sciences & L 65; Kent A Kiehl & Morris B Hoffman, “The Criminal Psychopath: History, 
Neuroscience, Treatment, and Economics” (2011) 51 Jurimetrics 355.
5. Ryberg, supra note 1 at 1. 
6. Ibid at 9.
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Jesper Ryberg, approaches the subject matter from a background in criminal 
justice ethics and neuroethics. As a professor of Ethics and Philosophy of Law at 
Roskilde University in Denmark, he has made an impressive contribution to the 
recent literature in the fields of penal theory, ethics, and neuroscience.7 
In his book, Ryberg questions the circumstances under which it may be 
ethically permissible to offer targeted NI to offenders in exchange for a reduced 
sentence, or even to impose NI as a form of punishment. This proposed treatment 
would target offenders that are likely to re-offend seeking to pacify certain mental 
traits that are linked to recidivism. The book represents an addition to a growing 
discourse focused criminal law’s “renewed infatuation” with neuroscience.8 
It is divided into seven chapters, but the overall discussion is oriented toward 
answering the following question: whether offering crime-preventative NI to 
offenders in exchange for a reduction of their punishment is ethically justifiable 
from a theoretical perspective (i.e., within an idealized penal system), and whether 
the same arguments would pass muster in an imperfect criminal justice system. 
Ryberg begins by addressing the legitimacy of offering the option of NI 
to offenders by evaluating whether or not it would vitiate the principle of 
informed consent.9 He finds that it would not be coercive to give this option, 
as it would constitute an offer rather than a threat.10 However, this assumes 
that valid consent is required for the exchange of NI for leniency to be morally 
acceptable.11 If the importance of consent reflects the significance of autonomy, 
then crime-preventative NI may be morally acceptable despite vitiating 
consent.12 Ryberg contends that this is because NI as a medical treatment would 
benefit society through crime reduction, analogous to the societal benefits of 
mandatory vaccination of infants. Further, Ryberg argues, the effects of NI on 
the offender may even enhance autonomy, if the purpose of the NI is to improve 
impulse control.13 
7. See e.g. Jesper Ryberg, “Proportionality and the Seriousness of Crimes” in Michael Tonry, 
ed, Of One-eyed and Toothless Miscreants: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime? (Oxford 
University Press, 2019); Jesper Ryberg, “Neuroethics and Brain Privacy” (2017) 23 Res 
Publica 153; Jesper Ryberg, “Neuroscientific Treatment of Criminals and Penal Theory” 
in David Birks & Thomas Douglas, eds, Treatment for Crime: Philosophical Essays on 
Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2018) 177. 
8. See Amanda C Pustilnik, “Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal 
Law” (2009) 44 Wake Forest L Rev 183 at 185. 
9. Ryberg, supra note 1 at 26. 
10. Ibid at 32. 
11. Ibid at 35. 
12. Ibid at 36.
13. Ibid at 37. 
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This view is among the more conservative in a polarized debate with respect 
to the requirements for administration of NIs to offenders. Many have argued 
that doing so would only be permissible under certain conditions: for example, 
where there is a lack of coercion, informed consent, or voluntariness on the part 
of the offender.14 While this seems to be the prevailing view, other scholars have 
echoed the argument that offering NI in return for leniency is not coercive, 
and accordingly, does not undermine autonomy.15 Regardless, challenging the 
requirement of consent altogether is a highly controversial stance.16
Ryberg goes on to argue that, even if consent need not be obtained, the use of 
NIs on offenders may still be morally unacceptable if it is exploitative or outside 
the ambit of appropriate state action.17 He describes wrongful exploitation as 
taking advantage of another party in dire circumstances, where unfairness can 
arise—either in the process or outcome of a transaction.18 Ryberg concludes that 
NIs are not exploitative, finding a lack of unfair advantage, but does not come to a 
conclusion with respect to the administration of NIs by the state.19 Nevertheless, 
he finds the use of NIs to be justifiable by analogizing them with existing forms of 
punishment.20 In other words, Ryberg questions the requirement of consent for 
the use of NIs on offenders by pointing out that incarceration as a punishment 
does not require consent. This is not an uncommon line of reasoning for 
justifying the use of NIs within criminal justice systems. The comparison between 
directly intervening with the brains of offenders (i.e., through NIs) and indirect 
intervention through punishment, rehabilitation, parole conditions, et cetera, 
has been made by other proponents of NI.21
Having found it ethically acceptable to offer NIs to an offenders in return for 
leniency, Ryberg explores the ethical considerations surrounding the compulsory 
14. See e.g. Henry T Greely, “Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility 
but Treatment” (2008) 56 U Kan L Rev 1103 at 1134; Thomas Douglas, “Criminal 
Rehabilitation Through Medical Intervention: Moral Liability and the Right to Bodily 
Integrity” (2014) 18 J Ethics 101 at 103; Kari A Vanderzyl, “Castration as an Alternative to 
Incarceration: An Impotent Approach to the Punishment of Sex Offenders” (1994) 15 N III 
UL Rev 107 at 140.
15. See e.g. A Wertheimer & FG Miller, “There Are (STILL) No coercive Offers” (2013) 40 J 
Medical Ethics 592.
16. Douglas, supra note 14 at 104. 
17. Ryberg, supra note 1 at 39.
18. Ibid at 39-41. 
19. Ibid at 42-43, 47. 
20. Ibid at 49. 
21. See Greely, supra note 14; Douglas, supra note 14. 
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administration of NI to offenders as a form of moral bioenhancement.22 
He addresses the objections that moral bioenhancement presupposes a standard 
acceptable moral disposition (i.e., a moral “yardstick”);23 that it would prevent 
offenders from being able to choose between right and wrong;24 and that it would 
fundamentally change an offender’s identity.25 In refuting these points, Ryberg 
again relies on parallels with incarceration as a form of punishment, and questions 
the general implications of the use of (and need for) a moral “yardstick.”26 This 
position is more radical, and is generally met with disagreement.27 Proponents of 
Ryberg’s view have analogized the use of compulsory NI to mandatory medical 
intervention for the purpose of infectious disease control.28 Critics, on the other 
hand, raise the concern of potential governmental misuse of such interference 
with the minds of offenders.29
The second question Ryberg addresses is whether compulsory NIs intrude 
on bodily integrity, and if so, whether that makes NI morally unacceptable.30 
Ryberg argues for a threshold position where the right to bodily integrity can 
be overruled where enough is at stake.31 Again, by analogy, he justifies the 
use of non-surgical intrusions on bodily integrity by comparing NIs to other 
compulsory medical violations of offenders’ bodily integrity, such as drawing 
blood.32 Ryberg’s reasoning on the topic of bodily integrity closely follows that 
of Thomas Douglas, some five years earlier.33 Douglas also compares the moral 
permissibility of administering non-consensual NIs on offenders with the lack 
22. Ryberg, supra note 1 at 53. 
23. Ibid at 57.
24. Ibid at 61.
25. Ibid at 69.
26. Ibid at 59, 62, 65, 73.
27. See e.g. Elizabeth Shaw, “The Right to Bodily Integrity and the Rehabilitation of Offenders 
through Medical Interventions: A Reply to Thomas Douglas” (2019) 12 Neuroethics 97; 
Charlotte Kouo, “The Prospects of Introducing Neurochemical Intervention in Crime 
Policy” (2018) 6 Leg Issues J 33; David Birks & Alena Buyx, “Punishing Intentions and 
Neurointerventions” 9 AJOB Neuroscience 133; Stephen J Morse, “Neuroscience, Free will, 
and Criminal Responsibility” in Walter Glannon, ed, Free will and the brain: Neuroscientific, 
philosophical, and legal perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 251.
28. Jonathan Pugh & Thomas Douglas, “Justification for Non-Consensual Medical Intervention: 
From Infectious Disease Control to Criminal Rehabilitation” (2016) 35 Crim Justice 
Ethics 205 at 206. 
29. See Kouo, supra note 27 at 40.
30. Ryberg, supra note 1 at 75.
31. Ibid at 80.
32. Ibid at 81-82. 
33. Douglas, supra note 14 at 107.
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of consent generally required for punishment within criminal justice systems.34 
He argues that, in committing crimes, offenders may become liable to some 
forms of what he terms “medical correctives.”35 Douglas and Ryberg’s works are 
in conversation with one another, with Douglas choosing to refute the consent 
requirement by appealing to how the right to bodily integrity applies to offenders 
in the criminal justice context.36 
Physical integrity, however, does not encompass the right to mental non- 
interference, which ostensibly protects offenders from forcible mind-alteration. 
Nevertheless, Ryberg concludes that such a right is either so broad as to be 
incompatible with existing types of punishment, or so narrow that it is not 
infringed by the administration of compulsory NI on offenders.37 Interestingly, 
Ryberg does not consider how medical interventions are used to affect the minds 
of offenders in other contexts, such as with drug addiction or mental illness.38 
For instance, in Canada, the Criminal Code permits sentencing judges to include 
optional conditions to a sentence, such as attending a treatment program.39 
Alternatively, in the United States, participation in drug treatment programs 
may be a required condition of probation or parole.40 The United States has 
also implemented a scheme for administering mandatory NIs to mentally ill 
offenders, provided the treatment is in the offender’s medical interest and the 
offender poses a danger to themself or those around them.41 
Having defended the concept of compulsory NI, Ryberg invites the reader 
to reconsider the use of NI on offenders, not in lieu of punishment, but as a 
punishment itself.42 He lays out the four pillars of punishment: imposing harm 
upon an offender;43 providing retribution for illegal conduct;44 imposing the 
authority of the state to punish;45 and symbolizing reprobation.46 Ryberg easily 
34. Ibid at 105.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid. See also Pugh & Douglas, supra note 28.  
37. Ryberg, supra note 1 at 92. 
38. See e.g. Greely, supra note 14; Donna L Hall, Richard P Miraglia & Li-Wen G Lee, “The 
Increasingly Blurred Line between Mad and Bad: Treating Personality Disorders in the Prison 
Setting” (2010) 74 Alta L Rev 1277.
39. RSC 1985, c C-46, s 742.3(2)(e).  
40. Greely, supra note 14 at 1108.
41. Ibid at 1109. 
42. Ryberg, supra note 1 at 95. 
43. Ibid at 101. 
44. Ibid at 102. 
45. Ibid at 103.
46. Ibid at 104. 
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finds that the imposition of NI on offenders satisfies these requirements, and 
therefore NI might theoretically serve as a form of punishment.47 
But in order to properly function as punishment, it must be a justified 
punishment.48 Such punishments must meet additional penal theoretical 
requirements: encouraging inclusion and reintegration;49 drawing attention to 
the nature of the crime and its consequences;50 facilitating remorse;51 engaging the 
rational capacities of the offender;52 and creating a proportional punishment.53 
Ryberg argues that, as a method of cognitive rehabilitative therapy, NIs can 
improve cognitive abilities and thus satisfy the first four requirements. When 
it comes to proportionality, Ryberg emphasizes that, in order to satisfy this, 
NI should be comparable in severity to other punishments.54 
There are also characteristics that punishments must not possess in order to be 
morally acceptable in principle.55 These include: punishments that treat people 
as an instrument (i.e., as means to an end);56 punishments that are degrading, 
humiliating, or violate human dignity;57 punishments that destroy or prevent 
the offender from exercising their rational capacity;58 and punishments that 
portray offenders as sub-human.59 Ryberg’s approach to his analysis within this 
framework is consistent: he finds no clear evidence that certainly places the use 
of NIs on offenders into any of these categories of unacceptable punishment.60
Ryberg also considers whether it would be morally legitimate for physicians 
to use their medical expertise to administer NIs to offenders.61 An objection 
could be raised based on the moral significance of: the Hippocratic Oath; the 
physician-patient relationship; and the general trust we place in physicians.62 
First, Ryberg argues that crime-preventative NIs do not violate the Hippocratic 
47. Ibid at 106. 
48. Ibid at 107. 
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid at 110. 
51. Ibid at 113. 
52. Ibid at 115-116.
53. Ibid at 118.
54. Ibid at 119.
55. Ibid at 120. 
56. Ibid at 123.
57. Ibid at 124.
58. Ibid at 127.
59. Ibid at 129. 
60. Ibid at 132. 
61. Ibid at 137.
62. Ibid at 138. 
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Oath because: physicians regularly act in ways that do not involve healing or 
preventing harm;63 physicians should engage in functions with morally desirable 
outcomes;64 and many clinical treatments actually necessitate some harm.65 
Ryberg pre-empts objections based on the special responsibility of physicians to 
patients by asserting that there are morally acceptable occasions which require 
physicians to act outside the interests of their patients,66 or even in the interests of 
the state (e.g., quarantining patients to prevent an infectious outbreak).67 Finally, 
he argues against a trust-based objection by comparing the administration of NIs 
with physician participation in the death penalty, for which there is no empirical 
evidence of an adverse effect on the public’s trust in physicians.68
The final question considered is whether historical abuses of offenders 
constitute an objection to the introduction of NIs within contemporary criminal 
justice schemes.69 Ryberg characterizes this argument by borrowing from Emily 
McTernan’s principle of “pessimist induction,” which amounts to an adverse 
presumption informed by prior unethical behaviour.70 Ryberg finds that, in order 
for this to constitute a valid objection, the pessimist induction principle requires 
specificity in scope. Even then, he argues, it is unclear whether or not an adverse 
inductive inference is morally acceptable reasoning.71 The principle itself is flawed 
by a lack of counter-examples of historical successes, rather than just the mistakes 
made in wrongfully administering NIs.72 Ultimately, Ryberg concludes that past 
misuses of NIs should not bar future use, so long as this medical history remains 
relevant as a cautionary tale.73 
In the seventh and final chapter, Ryberg gives a long-awaited disclaimer: that 
the ethical arguments advanced up until this point presuppose a criminal justice 
system that conforms to theoretical ideals.74 He acknowledges the significant 
discrepancy between penal theory and penal practice, notably resulting in 
63. Ibid at 146.
64. Ibid at 147.
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid at 152.
67. Ibid at 152-153. 
68. Ibid at 157.
69. Ibid at 166-167. 
70. Ibid at 172. 
71. Ibid at 173-177. 
72. Ibid at 180.
73. Ibid at 185. 
74. Ibid at 187.
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phenomena such as mass incarceration, increasing rates of imprisonment, and 
over-punishment.75 
Ryberg goes on to re-evaluate the objections discussed in the previous 
chapters through the lens of a non-ideal criminal justice system.76 First, on the 
issue of coercion, he finds that in a system where the baseline punishment is not 
morally justifiable, offering NI in exchange for leniency would indeed constitute 
coercion.77 Secondly, Ryberg’s view of compulsion is that, in existing criminal 
systems where prediction of recidivism is unreliable, and inefficient punishment 
schemes are implemented, it would be reckless for NIs to be administered as a 
compulsory treatment.78 Ryberg then reconsiders the administration of NIs as 
punishment. He argues that since current penal systems do not practically meet 
theoretical punishment requirements, NIs should not be imposed for fear that 
they will not be implemented consistently in light of these criteria.79 Finally, 
Ryberg returns to the objection of physician participation. Objections based 
on the Hippocratic Oath and the physician-patient relationship, he argues, 
no longer hold water given the unreliability of recidivism rates and the potential 
for incorrect or harmful administration of NIs.80 
The idea that Ryberg’s arguments are valid only with the presupposition 
of ideal penal theory both undercuts his position and reinforces the pattern of 
reasoning by analogy in this text. Certainly, in an ideal penal system, it would 
be valid to justify concessions (e.g., to consent, autonomy, bodily integrity, 
et cetera) by appealing to how parallel concessions were successfully made within 
the same framework. The use of incarceration is generally legitimized in the 
face of human rights concerns as a means to protect society from criminals.81 
While the goal of crime reduction by means of NI flows from this concept, the 
justification of encroachment upon offenders’ rights needs to do more than 
borrow from adjacent policy objectives. Further, it has been argued that the idea 
of “pre-empting” criminality with NIs contradicts the value of due process, as the 
existing model of criminal justice is designed to respond to crime.82 To employ 
NIs in this way would, in essence, use factors that are outside the conscious 
75. Ibid at 189-190. 
76. Ibid at 195.
77. Ibid at 197.
78. Ibid at 205. 
79. Ibid at 206. 
80. Ibid at 209. 
81. Kouo, supra note 27 at 41. 
82. Ibid at 40.
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control of offenders to discriminate between them.83 This would certainly raise 
additional ethical questions. 
At the time of writing, it is still unclear whether the bourgeoning field of 
neurocriminology should prove to be so legitimate as to allow NIs to become 
part of penal policy.84 There is a diverse plurality of neuroethical perspectives and 
approaches to modern cognitive science, the more radical of which will likely 
never see the inside of a prison.85 Some authors have even expressed concerns 
related to the ethical considerations surrounding the development of safe and 
effective NI treatments.86 For example, animal models may not suffice for testing 
cutting-edge therapies, and there would be significant hurdles—both practical 
and ethical—to conducting clinical trials with humans.
Overall, Neurointerventions, Crime, and Punishment is an important foray 
into the ethics of incorporating NIs into penal policy. Ryberg openly addresses 
seemingly unsavoury questions and brings a complex history of crime and 
punishment up to date with contemporary moral theory and cognitive science 
initiatives. With this text, Ryberg expands upon his previous contributions by 
offering an in-depth, dispassionate defence of NI in lieu of punishment (and as 
punishment). This book is a key contribution to the conversation surrounding 
medical ethics. In furthering this discourse, Ryberg makes palatable even the 
most radical components of the debate. This book will likely encourage further 
research and facilitate a more nuanced engagement with this issue among experts. 
83. Bedard, supra note 4 at 320.
84. Kouo, supra note 27 at 43.
85. Matthias Mahlmann, “Ethics, Law and the Challenge of Cognitive Science” (2007) 8 
German LJ 577 at 577.
86. Greely, supra note 14 at 1121. 

